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Notes
Losing the Battle on Obscenity, But Can
We Win the War?: The National
Endowment for the Arts' Fight Against
Funding Obscene Artistic Works
Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundationv. Frohnmayer'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Theater. Symphony. Ballet. Photography. Rap. These art forms have
been enriching our culture for decades. Often considered the distinction
between a sophisticated society and an uncivilized group, art has its roots in
the human spirit of expression. Recognizing the need for the arts to flourish
in our society, Congress established the National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA).2 This government agency promotes the arts through funding the
creation and production of artistic works. Recently, however, controversial

1. 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
2. The NEA was established in 1965. The primary goals and purposes of the
NEA are listed in the following legislation:
"The Congress finds and declares the following:
(6) The arts and the humanities reflect the high place accorded by the
American people to the nation's rich cultural heritage and to the fostering
of mutual respect for the diverse beliefs and values of all persons and
groups.
(7) The practice of art and the study of the humanities require constant
dedication and devotion. While no government can call a great artist or
scholar into existence, it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal
Government to help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging
freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material
conditions facilitating the release of this creative talent."
20 U.S.C. § 951 (1988).
3. Artists receive funding from the NEA in the following manner:
(c) The Chairperson, with the advice of the National Council on the Arts,
is authorized to establish and carry out a program of contracts with, or
grants-in-aid or loans to, groups or, in appropriate cases, individuals of
exceptional talent engaged in or concerned with the arts, for the purpose of
enabling them to provide or support-
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artistic works have triggered debate over NEA funding. Some artistic works
featuring images that go beyond the candor of nude figures have divided
viewers into supporters of art and those who shield their eyes from the
controversial scenes. The threshold of what art is acceptable and what art is
improper has left artists explaining or defending their craft. After all, the hazy
line separating art from obscenity is unquestionably difficult to define. But
when government funded photographs depict one man urinating into the
mouth of another man, and black-and-white prints feature other provocative
subject matters of questionable merit, it is not surprising that legislators
demand reform. In 1989, Congress passed a federal law prohibiting NEA
funding for obscene artistic works.4 Obscenity determinations were to be
made exclusively by the NEA. 5 Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer6 , the first case interpreting this legislation, found the obscenity
statute unconstitutional. This Note addresses the NEA's attempt to implement
section 304(a) and its failure to do so. A discussion of the aftermath of Bella
Lewitzky follows.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
consolidated two actions containing essentially identical facts into one case,
Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer.' The court found
numerous facts and questions of law common to the two actions, and therefore
found consolidation proper.'

(1) projects and productions which have substantial national or
international artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis
to American creativity and cultural diversity and to the maintenance and encouragement of professional excellence;
20 U.S.C. § 954 (1990).
4. Section 304 of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989) [hereinafter, Regulated Agencies Act].
See infra note 24 for the relevant textual portion of the statute.
5. Regulated Agencies Act, supra note 4, at 741.
6. 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
7. In each action, the two named defendants were the National Endowment for
the Arts (NEA) and its Chairperson, John E. Frohnmayer. Id. at 775.
8. Id. at 774.
9. Id. at 775. The cases were consolidated in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P.
42(a).
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A. The Plaintiffs in Bella Lewitzky
The Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation (Lewitzky) is a non-profit
corporation operating as the Lewitzky Dance Company. ° Lewitzky produces
original modem dance works and performs its dance creations throughout the
United States and foreign countries.11 Since 1972, Lewitzky has received
more than $1,400,000 in grants from the NEA.12
The second named plaintiff in the case was the Newport Harbor Art
Museum (Newport).' Newport is a non-profit corporation that promotes the
visual arts.' 4 The museum houses a permanent collection of artwork in
Newport Beach, California.? The museum also displays independent
exhibits temporarily before they circulate to other art museums across the
nation.' 6 During the past eighteen years, the NEA awarded Newport
$1,263,020 in grants. 7
B. The NEA GrantProcess
On January 12, 1989, Lewitzky' 8 applied to the NEA for a 1990-1991
grant. 19 Lewitzky followed the identical grant process it had utilized for
almost two decades. 20 The process consisted of a simple two-step procedure.
First, applicants seeking NEA funding file an application with the NEA in the
fiscal year prior to the year that grant funds are dispensed.2' The NEA either
grants or denies funding based on the application. 22 In the second step,

10. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 775.
11. Id.
12. Iai
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 775-76.
17. Id. at 776.
18. Although only Lewitzky is cited, both plaintiffs are meant to be considered
throughout.
19. Id. If awarded NEA funding, Lewitzky would use the money for the payment
of salaries and the overall achievement and development of the artistic goals of the
dance foundation. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. "No payment shall be made under this section except upon application.... [T]he Chairperson shall ensure that(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and
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applicants chosen for NEA funding must submit a request form before actually
receiving any money.'
On October 23, 1989, the United States Congress caused the NEA to alter
the grant process by enacting section 304 of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1990.' The enactment of section 304 was Congress's

respect for the diverse -beliefs and values of the American public; and
(2) applications are consistent with the purposes of this section. Such
regulations and procedures shall clearly indicate that obscenity is without
artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be funded. Projects,
productions, workshops and programs that are determined to be obscene are
prohibited from receiving financial assistance under this subchapter from the
National Endowment for the Arts."
20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1990).
23. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 776. Although simple in nature, the entire
grant process endures over a period of about six months to a year.
24. Id. at 776. The relevant portions of § 304 include:
Sec. 304. No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be
available for any activity or the publication or distribution of literature that
in any way tends to promote public support or opposition to any legislative
proposal on which congressional action is not complete: Provided,That(a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National
Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities
may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the
judgment of the National Endowment for the Arts or the National
Endowment for the Humanities may be considered obscene, including but
not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual
exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress:
(1) That under the present procedures employed for awarding
National Endowment for the Arts grants ... it is possible for

projects to be funded without adequate review of the artistic
content or value of the work.
(2) That recently works have been funded which are without
artistic value but which are criticized as pornographic and
shocking by any standards.
(3) That censorship inhibits and stultifies the full expression of
art.
(4) That free inquiry and expression is reaffirmed. Therefore, be
it resolved:
(A) That all artistic works do not have artistic or
humanistic excellence....
(B) That the Chairman of the National Endowment
for the arts [sic] has the responsibility to determine
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attempt to control the ultimate use of NEA funding by prohibiting recipients
from using the money to produce or exhibit obscene materialsO According
to section 304(a), determinations of whether an artistic work is obscene were
left to the exclusive judgment of the NEA.2
As a result of this legislation, the NEA amended the second step of the
grant process by adding a certification requirement. 27 The certification
requirement mandated that pre-approved applicants, such as Lewitzky, agree
in writing "in advance that none of the funds would be used 'to promote,
'
disseminate, or produce materials which... may be considered obscene. ot2
On January 4, 1990, nearly one year after Lewitzky applied for an NEA
grant, it was awarded $72,000.29 By this time section 304(a) was in effect.
Consistent with the change in the grant process, the NEA provided Lewitzky
with a list of conditions that Lewitzky was required to abide by upon receipt
of the grant.3 ° One of the conditions required compliance with section
304(a).3' Hence, Lewitzky was forced to condition its acceptance of the
NEA funding by adhering to the obscenity ban.3 2 Lewitzky, however,
indicated its refusal to comply with the obscenity condition, by crossing out
the conditional language.3 3 The NEA, in response, cancelled all future
funding to Lewitzky.34

whether such an application should be funded.
Regulated Agencies Act, supra note 5, at 741.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 776.
28. Id. (quoting Regulated Agencies Act, supra note 5, at 741).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 777.
32. Id.
33. Id. The manager of the Lewitzky Dance Foundation filled out the certification
requirement but crossed out the paragraph on obscenity before mailing it to the NEA.
In response, the NEA wrote to Lewitzky explaining that funding was contingent on

adherence to all conditions, including the obscenity requirement. Id.
34. Id. Bella Lewitzky was not alone in refusing to comply with the NEA's
certification requirement. The following is a list of designated NEA grantees who also
refused to sign the NEA's obscenity waiver. Included in this list is the amount of
funding that was foregone:
1. Feme Ackerman (Venice, CA) $7,000.
2. American Poetry Review (Philadelphia, PA) $10,000.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Arizona State University (Tempe, AZ) $9,965.
Art Institute of Southern California (Pasadena, CA) $15,000.
CCLM/Paris Review (New York, NY) $10,000.
Field Museum of Natural History (Chicago, IL) $ 21,600.
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C. The NEA 's Policy on Obscenity
The NEA provided Lewitzky and all other recipients of NEA funding
with a statement of the NEA's policy on obscenity." The policy statement
explained how the NEA defines and evaluates obscenity. 36 The basis for
making determinations of obscenity was identical to the standard established
by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California.37 The Miller
court defined obscene artistic work as "art which: (1) when taken as a whole,
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
appeals to the prurient interest (2) depicts or describes sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way and (3)
taken as whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
38
political, or scientific value.
In addition to pronouncing the obscenity standard, the NEA stated the
procedure for prosecuting grant recipients in violation of the obscenity
standard.3 9 The NEA would first send notice to grant recipients and then
provide an opportunity for the grantee to "justify" the artistic work in
question. 40 If the NEA ultimately found a section 304(a) obscenity violation,
the agency would retrieve already disbursed grants, as well as withhold any
future funding designated for the recipient. 1

7. Gettysburg Review (Gettysburg, PA) $4,550.
8. Jewish Community Centers of Greater Philadelphia (Philadelphia, PA)
$10,000.
9. Jewish Community Museum (San Francisco, CA) $5,000.
10. Los Angeles Festival (Los Angeles, CA) $30,000.
11. National Book Foundation (New York, NY) $5,000.
12. New York Shakespeare Festival (New York, NY) $380,500.
13. Northern California Grantmakers (San Francisco, CA) $75,000.
14. Oregon Shakespeare Festival (Ashland, OR) $49,500.
15. Penn State University (State College, PA) $5,000.
16. Radio Bilingue (Fresno, CA) $15,000.
17. Time and Space, LTD (New York, NY) $10,000.
18. University of Iowa Press (Iowa City, IA) $12,000.
As of January 10, 1991, the total amount of grants rejected by these NEA
grantees, including Bella Lewitzky, was $675,115. This information was provided by
the National Endowment for the Arts.
35. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 777.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at n.4 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
39. Id.
40. All justifications were required to be in writing. Id.
41. Id.
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Lewitzky and Newport brought suit against the NEA on two grounds.
First, the plaintiffs alleged that the NEA's certification requirement banning
obscene artistic works was "unconstitutionally vague" and therefore violated

the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 42
The plaintiffs asserted that grant recipients could only "speculate" as to how
the NEA would measure obscenity because the determination of what
constitutes obscenity was left to the judgment of a federal administrative
agency. 43 The plaintiffs also alleged that the vagueness of the certification
requirement violated the First Amendment by "creat[ing] a chilling effect on
speech." 44 Plaintiffs contended that any bona fide attempt at obeying the ban
on obscenity would result in overly cautious behavior on the part of NEA
recipients that could lead to sacrificing the pursuit of legitimate artistic works
for fear of crossing an ill-defined notion of obscenity.4 5
Upon motions for summary judgment by both parties to the suit, the
district court granted plaintiffs' motion. 46 The court, implicitly agreeing with
both claims of Lewitzky, held that the NEA's certification requirement was
unconstitutionally vague because interpretations of obscenity could not be
lawfully declared on a nation-wide basis by the NEA and, as such, the
certification created a chilling effect on the plaintiffs' First Amendment
freedom of speech rights.47
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in Bella Lewitzky argued that the NEA certification
requirement was unconstitutionally vague.48 Because a federal agency made
the obscenity determinations by applying a single, nation-wide standard of
obscenity, Lewitzky contended that all grant recipients at best could merely
guess as to how or what the NEA would find obscene. 49 Lewitzky argued
that the concept of what constitutes obscenity is an unarticulated, uncertain
notion that can not be legitimately observed.50
51
According to the modem analytical framework in Miller v. California,

42. Id. at 781.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 782.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 785.
47. Id. at 782-85.
48. Id. at 781.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller court was the first court in nearly a decade
to arrive at a majority opinion that established guidelines on obscenity cases. In so

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

7

Missouri LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art.[Vol.
12 57
MISSOURI
REVIEW

obscenity determinations are made by juries applying contemporary community standards, not federal agencies such as the NEA. It is therefore inapposite
for the NEA to make obscenity determinations as outlined in Miller. 2 The
NEA,acting as a federal agency, is essentially powerless to access community
standards, which vary from one community to the next, and apply those
standards. As a result, Lewitzky had no notice of what the NEA would find
obscene. Thus, Lewitzky maintained that the NEA's certification requirement,
providing for a federal agency to make obscenity determinations, was
unconstitutionally vague and violated the Due Process clause.3
A. The Vagueness Doctrine
The seminal United States Supreme Court case on the unconstitutional
vagueness doctrine is Grayned v. City of Rockford 4 In Grayned, a protestor
attacked the constitutionality of a city ordinance on vagueness grounds after
he was arrested for disrupting the normal activities of a public high school by
making too much noise. 55 The plaintiff was demonstrating on school
56
property in a protest calling for racial equality within the school system.
The ordinance in question prohibited protestors from making "any noise or
diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such
school session or class thereof. ...
The Grayned court set out the standards for determining whether the
ordinance violated the unconstitutional vagueness doctrine: 8

doing, the court overruled the prior "utterly without redeeming social value" test of
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
52. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. Under Miller, the basic guidelines for the trier of
fact to abide by when hearing obscenity cases are:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest ...(b)whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Id.
53. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 781.
54. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
55. Id. at 105.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 108. The court found that the local ordinance in question was not
"impermissibly-vague" after concluding that the prohibitions of the ordinance were
made clear. Id. at 108-09.
58. Id.
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It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend
several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them.5 9

In its interpretation of the statute, the Court neither found nor required
"mathematical certainty," but instead upheld the statute because it conveyed
an overall clear sense of what was prohibited. 60
1. Federal Obscenity Statutes and Vagueness
Other federal legislation outlawing obscenity has been challenged on the
grounds of vagueness. These constitutional attacks, based on the argument
that obscenity is too imprecise a term to be reasonably understood, have been
rejected by the Supreme Court.6' Despite these rulings, the perimeters
surrounding obscenity, as opposed to indecency or provocation, remain
difficult to ascertain.
Although inherently subjective, the term "obscenity" is not utterly
incapable of definition. The precedent of Miller allows jurisdictions to invoke
"contemporary community standards" to arrive at a definition of obscenity.
One limit on defining obscenity under Miller, however, is that obscenity
cannot be legally defined in terms of a broad-sweeping, national staidard. 62
Constitutional infringements can arise when administrative agencies
attempt to enforce obscenity statutes. The United States Supreme Court faced
the issue of federal agency regulation of obscenity in Sable Communications
of California v. Federal Communications Commission6'
In Sable, a
corporation providing sexually-explicit phone messages' for a fee brought

59. Id. at 110. Interestingly, the court concluded that the antinoise statute was not
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 109.
60. Id. at 110. The Court went on to state: "[a]s always, enforcement requires
the exercise of some degree of police judgment, but as confined, that degree of
judgment here is permissible." Id. at 114.
61. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Reidel v. United States,
402 U.S. 351 (1971).
62. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
63. 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
64. Id. at 2832. These pre-recorded messages are commonly known as "dial-apor." Id.
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suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C.
section 223(b).' This statute criminalized the act of producing and making
available to the public obscene communications via the telephone.6
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute's ban on
obscenity.67 The high court first noted that obscenity is not encompassed
under the First Amendment as protected speech. 6' The court next determined
that the main issue was not whether the statute could define obscenity on a
nation-wide basis, but whether Congress has the power to proscribe obscenity.6 9 The Court found that Congress is so empowered.7"
Sable is distinguishable from Bella Lewitzky in a critical manner. The
plaintiff in Sable solely contested the constitutionality of the statute, not the
FCC's policies for implementing the statute. The district court specifically
"reject[ed] the argument that the statute was unconstitutional because it created
a national standard of obscenity."7 1

On review, the Supreme Court af-

firmed. 72
The Sable Court, flatly disagreeing with the argument that section 223
generated a nation-wide standard of obscenity, held that the statute did not
infringe on the threshold "community standard" test of Miller.73 "[T]he fact
that 'distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying
community standards in the various federal districts into which they transmit

65. Id. Section 223(b) had sustained several amendments throughout the appellate
stages of this case. The version in effect when Sable Communications brought suit
read:
(b) (1) Whoever knowingly(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign
communication, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by
recording device) any obscene or indecent communication for
commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to
be used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be
fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
Id. at 2834 n.4. (citing Pub. L. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2835. But see id. at 2840-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. The court cited Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973),
as authority for this proposition of law. Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2835.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2832.
72. Id. at 2835.
73. Id.
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the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the
failure of application of uniform national standards of obscenity. ' " 74
Recognizing that jurisdictions disagree on what may be considered obscene,
the couit refused to completely roadblock Sable Communication's business. 5
However, the risk of anticipating how various communities would judge
obscenity was passed on to the company. 6 Coupled with that risk was
Sable's need to tailor its phone messages accordingly."
The remainder of this Section centers on the reasons why federal agencies
are unable to make obscenity determinations. Emphasis is placed on the
processes of federal agencies. This focus in turn helps explain the district
court's holding in Bella Lewitzky that the NEA's certification requirement is
unconstitutionally vague.
2. The Policy Statement of the NEA
In response to section 304(a)'s limit on the use of NEA funding, the NEA
created what essentially amounted to an obscenity-waiver. The NEA required
grant recipients, before receiving funds, to sign a certification requirement in
which recipients agreed not to use the grant money for obscene artistic
works. 78 The NEA explained its position on obscenity by drafting a9
"Statement of Policy and Guidance for the Implementation of Section 304."0
This statement of policy announced "that the NEA would essentially rely on
the statement of Miller v. California... as a basis for making determinations
regarding obscenity.""0 As a means of procuring notice of how the NEA
would implement section 304(a), each recipient of NEA funding received a
copy of the policy statement."'
Policy statements of administrative agencies are not the products of
agency legislation. Policy statements, as defined by the court in Pacific Gas
& Electric Company v. Federal Power Commission,8 2 are "the outcome of
neither a rulemaking nor an adjudication; it is neither a rule nor a precedent
but is merely an announcement to the public of the policy which the agency
hopes to implement in future rulemakings or adjudications."8 3 Agency policy

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2835-36 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)).
Id. at 2836.
Id.
Id.
Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 776.
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id.
506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 38.
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statements are legally significant because agencies are not bound by the
positions expressed in the policy statement.' The Pacific Gas court went
on to express this general proposition of administrative law. "A general
statement of policy... does not establish a 'binding norm' .... The agency
cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a
general statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish
as policy... [and] the agency's tentative intentions for the future."8
The court in Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of Nav/ 6 emphasized the
freedom of agencies to stray from an agency position expressed in the policy
statement. "[T]he agency remains free in any particular case to diverge from
t
87
whatever outcome the policy statement or interpretive rule might suggest."
Agency policy statements must be distinguished from a substantive rule
of the agency. The relevant distinction is that an agency is bound to follow
its substantive rules, but not the policy statement. When an agency chooses
to effectuate its functions through rulemaking, the agency must follow the
governing procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' This
procedure, commonly known as the notice-and-comment period, requires the
agency to give notice and an opportunity for interested persons to be heard
before promulgating a valid, binding rule.89
Disputes over this distinction between policy statements and substantive
rules often arise when an entity brings an action to contest the validity of an
agency's written announcement. In these situations it is unclear whether the
written announcement of the agency is a substantive rule or a policy
statement. The challenging party alleges that the agency has mislabeled the
announcement as a policy statement, but in actuality the agency has promulgated a rule. Because the agency failed to follow the necessary notice-andcomment procedures, the rule is void. Of course, the agency contests the
challenge by pleading that the written announcement in question is a policy
statement. The courts clarify the ambiguity.

84. See Dyer v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 682, 685 (6th Cir.
1989);. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Economic Regulatory Admin.,
847 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir. 1988); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N., Inc.,
647 F.2d 796, 811 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Burlington N., Inc. v. United
States, 455 U.S. 907 (1982). Limited authority has suggested that an agency policy
statement could, in fact, bind the agency promulgating it. Nitional Latino Media
Coalition v. F.C.C., 816 F.2d 785, 788 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
85. Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at 38.
86. 843 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 537.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
89. Id.
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The court in National Latino Media Coalition v. .FCC' was faced with
the issue of identifying a written statement of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) as either a rule or a policy statement. In Latino Media,
the FCC released a written announcement to the public that permitted the
agency to conduct a lottery. The lottery allowed the FCC to break a tie over
which of many equally qualified applicants should receive an FCC-issued
license. 9' The court concluded that the announcement was a statement of
policy, not a rule.92 "These statements merely present an interpretation of
the agency's governing statute. They do not bind the Commission ever to
conduct a tie-breaker lottery."93
Two criteria guide courts in making the critical distinction between policy
statements and substantive rules. The court in American Bus Ass'n v. United
States9 identified these factors. "First ... unless a pronouncement acts
prospectively, it is a binding norm."' In other words, agency rules presently
affect parties, whereas policy statements have only future, if any, application.
"The second criterion is whether a purported policy statement genuinely leaves
the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion."' Hence, the
NEA's position on obscenity, as set out in its policy statement, could be
changed at anytime, applied differently in any given instance, or disregarded.
3. Jury Trials in Federal Agencies
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the Seventh Amendment, has held
that there is no right to a jury trial in federal agency hearings. 97 Federal
agencies, including the NEA, do not provide juries at their proceedings.
Compare this rule with the Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. California,
where obscenity determinations are to be made by juries of average persons
applying contemporary community standards. 98 The Miller court stressed the
crucial role of the jury system in evaluating allegedly obscene material. 99

90. 816 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

91. Id. at 787.
92. Id. at 787-88.
93. Id. at 789.
94. 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 529.
96. Id.
97. Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
98. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
99. "The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in
criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards
of their community, guided always by limiting instructions on the law." Miller, 413
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The Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. OccupationalSafety and
Health Review Comm'n'" reviewed the petitioner's claim to a Seventh
Amendment jury trial right in an administrative hearing. Petitioner Atlas,
charged with OSHA violations for maintaining hazardoqs worksites, sustained
penalties at the agency hearing. 1 0 OSHA acted as the exclusive fact-finder
during the hearing.'0° The Court upheld the constitutionality of an administrative agency acting as the sole fact-finder in agency proceedings.'0°
In Atlas Roofing, the court's. analysis of the right to a jury trial in agency
adjudications began with a textual interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. 1 4 The court reasoned that when Congress created new "statutory
obligations" not in existence at common law, the Seventh Amendment right
to trial by jury was not invoked at adjudications of these new obligationsOS
Therefore, agencies established by Congress to assess fines and penalties for
alleged violations of the new statutory obligations need not provide a jury.
"[T]he Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the
factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with
which the jury would be incompatible." 1°6
The Atlas Roofing court next found support in a series of prior cases,
consistent with its decision, addressing the absence of jury trials in agencies. 10 7 "In sum, the cases discussed ... stand clearly for the proposition
that when Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it may assign their
adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be
incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction. "108
B. FirstAmendment and ChillingEffects
The second argument brought by the plaintiffs in Bella Lewitzky was
based on a claim of First Amendment freedom of speech violations." 9 The
plaintiffs asserted that the vagueness of the NEA certification requirement

U.S. at 30.
100. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
101. Id. at 447.
102. Id. at 447-48.
103. Id. at 461.
104. Id. at 449-50. The Seventh Amendment reads as follows: "In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall not exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
105. Atlas Roofing, 442 U.S. at 450.
106. Id. (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 450-55.
108. Id. at 455.
109. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782.
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quashed the free flow of artistic expression of grant recipients by compelling
conformity to the obscenity ban." 0 This, in effect, created a "chilling
effect"". on the grant recipients' speech.
Several United States Supreme Court cases have addressed the chilling
effect doctrine. For example, the Court in Speiser v. Randall"2 struck down
a California statute that required veterans to promise under oath before
receiving the benefit of a tax exemption not to advocate the overthrow of the
government with force. The Speiser Court concluded that the statute violated
the petitioner's Due Process rights. The court warned that "where particular
speech falls close to the line separating the lawful from the unlawful, the
possibility of mistaken factfinder ... will create that the legitimate utterance4
will be penalized.""1 3 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Baggett v. Bullitt"
held that a state "oath" statute violated a petitioner's Due Process rights. The
statute conditioned employment with the state on a prospective employee's
signing an oath that pledged not to advocate or advise the government's
overthrow. "Those with-a conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear
or affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language...
restrict their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may
not be so inhibited."" 5
IV.

THE INSTANT DECISION

A. Lewitzky's Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim
The Court held that the NEA's certification requirement was unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." 6 The NEA, acting in its
capacity as a federal agency, can not alone make lawful judgments of
whether or not an artistic work is obscene, despite its promise to adhere to the
Miller standard." 7 Noting that a federal administrative agency is not bound
to follow the positions the agency has declared in its policy statement,"' the
Court reasoned that the NEA was not constrained by the Miller standard." 9

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
Id. at 526.
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
Id. at 372 (footnote omitted).
Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782.
Id.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782.
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To the contrary, the NEA was free to disregard its policy and adopt any other
perspective on obscenity. 1" The Court was skeptical of the NEA's pledge
of reliance on Miller, in that the NEA could be unfaithful or inconsistent.12
Lewitzky's vagueness claim succeeded for another reason. Even if the
NEA, arguendo, were to rigidly follow its policy statement, the NEA could
never produce adjudications with the procedural safeguards that were essential
to the holding of Miller.m The Miller court identified three procedural
safeguards that must occur at prosecutions of obscenity violations." There
must be a statute defining forbidden depictions of sexual conduct, a full
adversarial trial, and a jury of citizens applying community standards on
obscenity.'2
The court bypassed a critical analysis of the initial two safeguards and
focused its attention on the third. The court emphatically concluded that the
third safeguard was missing due to a federal agency's inherent inability to
provide jurors.' s "Simply stated, the NEA ia a national-level agency that,
by hypothesis, is incapable of applying varying community standards for
obscenity.'26
B. Lewitzky's ChillingEffect Claim
Lewitzky continued its attack on the certification requirement of the
NEA. Given the uncertainty of what the NEA might find obscene, Lewitzky
argued that conscientious grant recipients, to avoid producing obscenity, would
be stifled in their artistic creations. 127 Hence, this restriction would have a
"chilling8 effect" on the recipient's First Amendment freedom of speech
12
rights.
The court outlined the danger that would occur if Lewitzky attempted to
act in accordance with the certification requirement. "The creative expression
of the plaintiff Dance Foundation would necessarily be tempered were it to
sign the certification and then take seriously its pledge.... 129
The court then considered an extrinsic factor before concluding that the
certification requirement created a chilling effect on speech;' namely, the

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
IdId.
Id. See supra note 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I.
Id. at 783.
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significant influence NEA funding maintains in the United States art
world. 30 An artistic organization or individual that is awarded NEA grants
is practically guaranteed the receipt of private donations to follow the NEA
funding.'
Private individuals and organizations view initial NEA. funding
as the first step in selecting artistic works that are worthy of recognition and
support.'
Donations flow as a natural consequence. 33 If NEA funding
were threatened, the court implied, private donations logically would also be
threatened, and could equally likely be severed completely.3
V. ANALYSIS
Until 1990, the National Endowment for the Arts was a relatively
invisible federal agency. Its causes and purposes went unchecked by the
American public. That all changed when NEA-funded exhibits appeared in
galleries across the nation and shocked their viewers with provocative subject
matters that critics branded "obscene." Highlighted by the media's exploitive
attention, these artistic works incited the public to take steps to hold the NEA
accountable for its designations of federal grants. And who better to sound
the battle cry than those footing the bill-the taxpayers. 3 ' After all, it is
the taxpayer who, without knowledge, ultimately paid for the exhibits in
question.
A. The Underpinningsand Legislative Intent of Section 304
Senator Jesse Helms, frustrated with tax dollars provided for the Robert
Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano exhibits, authored legislation designed to
preclude NEA funding for obscene purposes. His legislation evolved into
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. NEA Chairperson John E. Frohnmayer appeared on the 700 Club for an
interview with host Pat Robertson. Mr. Robertson posed the following question to his
guest:
I want you to know that I think I speak for the taxpayers of America, we're
fed up to here with using our money for homo-erotic art and for antiChristian diatribes by way-out fringe artists. And I think that's going to
have to be stopped, and I, frankly, agree that the government has no part
in getting engaged in that. It's unconstitutional.
700 Club: Interview of National Endowment for the Arts Chairperson John
Frohnmayer(television broadcast, April 23 1990) (transcript on file with the MissouRi
LAw REvIEw) [hereinafter, 700 Club transcript].
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what appears presently as section 304.136 During a Senate floor debate over
the bill,, Senator Helms described what flawed results could occur in the
absence of his proposed legislation:
"I called attention to Mr. Serrano's so-called work of art, which portrays
Jesus Christ submerged in a bottle of the artist's urine, on May 18. [1]
pointed out that the National Endowment for the Arts had not only
for it, but they also
supported a $15,000 award honoring Mr. Serrano
37
helped promote and exhibit the work as well.'
Senator Helm's original proposal was broader in scope than the version
of section 304 that was eventually passed by Congress. "Specifically, my
amendment prohibits the use of the NEA's funds to support obscene or
materials which denigrate the objects or beliefs of a
indecent materials, 3or
8
particular religion.',
Section 304 faced opposition at its inception on the floor of the Senate
from lawmakers who cautioned about the wide reach of the statute. Obscenity
traditionally has been a sensitive area in which to legislate. These warnings
on the danger of proscribing obscenity foreshadowed litigation that would
arise over the statute's interpretation. Senator Wirth expressed his hesitation
in approving the legislation:
"I am deeply concerned that this provision sets a very dangerous precedent
of legislating a moral code on the value of particular works of art. This
action could effectively censor all artists and museums for years to come.
quality
Museums will restrain or suppress their creativity in providing
39
exhibits to the public, fearing the loss of Federal funds.'
Despite these warnings, section 304 was enacted on October 23, 1990.

136. See supra note 25.
137. 135 CONG. REc. S8807 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
The Senator also described other NEA-funded exhibits:
"One painting, entitled FirstSex, depicts a nude woman on her back, legs
open, knees up, and a little boy leaning against her leg looking into her face
while two sexually aroused older boys wait in the background. Another
work shows a man urinating on a boy lying in a gutter. Other, more
despicable, works were included as well."
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at S8813 (statement of Sen. Wirth).
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B. The Bella Lewitzky Court'sDecision
Bella Lewitzlcy is the first case interpreting the validity of section 304.
The court upheld the plaintiffs' claim that the.statute was unconstitutional due
to vagueness. 4 °
The Bella Lewitzky Court began its analysis of the vagueness doctrine by
expressing skepticism over the NEA's policy statement.14 ' The court
correctly noted that the NEA is not obligated to adhere to its policy statement.'42 The NEA, however, is bound to follow the United States Supreme
Court precedent of Miller. Therefore, the danger that the NEA would stray
from its policy statement and essentially establish an obscenity standard
different than that illuminated under Miller is almost nil.
Not all of the reasoning of Bella Lewitzky was so attenuated. A
convincing (and eventually debilitating) argument posed by the court was the
NEA's inability to access community standards by way of a jury in its
capacity as a federal agency.'
This is a legitimate rationale that perhaps
alone led to the ultimate collapse of the NEA's obscenity-waiver. Given the
fact that a Missouri community could consider an artistic work obscene, but
a New York community could consider the same work brilliant or avant
garde, it would be nearly impossible for a federal agency to assess and to
apply the sliding-scale of obscenity found in the myriad communities across
our nation."'
Although the court properly articulated its reasoning, the result of the
case, nonetheless, seems unsatisfactory. Essentially, the holding would allow
future artists receiving NEA funds to continue producing sadomasochistic art
works and present them in our nation's galleries, all at the taxpayers' expense.
C. What Remains to be Finished Under Section 304
Due to the public's outrage, the NEA was put on the defensive, rather
than the individuals responsible for generating the allegedly obscene artistic
works. The NEA was a logical target. Without the NEA funding, financially
crippled recipients presumably would lack the necessary resources to actively

140. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. "In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law, we must
continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied by the safeguards that judges, rules
of evidence, presumption of innocence, and other protective features provide . . .
Miller, 413 U.S. at 26.
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produce artistic works. NEA Chairperson John E. Frohnmayer 45 was
summoned to defend his agency's funding of two of the most visible and
controversial recipients, Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. In a recent
television interview, Frohnmayer explained the goals of his agency amidst a
barrage of accusatory questions.
[T]his agency can really provide a very valuable service to the American
people. And I think you [Pat Robertson] do us a real disservice by
focusing [on] about 20 photographs. They are, I think, if you take them by
themselves, obnoxious and obscene by anybody's standards. I'm not here
to defend those. I'm here to defend the record of this agency overall....
What the Endowment can do is really enhance the spirit of this country, and
I think that's what we're really all about.' 6
Frohnmayer's argument has merit. Wide-spread attention focused solely
on the extreme cases of NEA funding has yielded a misguided perception of
the NEA. Public exposure of exhibits, such as Robert Mapplethorpe's exhibit,
has chiefly erased the positive role played by the NEA in funding deserving
artistic works. Instead, concentration should shift to the recipients of the
funding. It .isthese recipients that cause and perpetuate the obscenity
problem, not the NEA. The grant process introduced by the NEA, however,
does not effectively prevent grant recipients from producing obscenity with
government tax dollars. Only after applicants have been approved for NEA
funding are they asked to sign the certification requirement. 147 Under this
framework, prosecution for obscenity could only occur after NEA funds have
been expended, the artistic work has been fabricated, and the obscenity has
appeared in our museums.
The sensible alternative to granting after-the-fact relief is to authorize the
NEA to implement preventative remedies. The NEA did, in fact, attempt to
take one form of a preventive measure; namely, asking grant recipients to
promise in writing not to use NEA funds to produce obscenity.148 The
obscenity-waiver included guidelines of what the NEA considered to be
obscene, coupled with specific examples of what was outlawed.'49 These
examples, drawn from the language of section 304, prohibited artistic works
depicting "sadomasochism, homoeroticism, [and] the sexual exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts."' 50 The NEA also issued a

145. Frohnmayer is also a defendant in Bella Lewitzky.
146. 700 Club transcript,supra note 137, at 5, 7.

147. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 776.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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policy statement signifying its pledge to adhere to the Miller test in making
determinations of obscenity. The Bella Lewitzky court, however, struck down
this preventive alternative due to vagueness.''
Has the Bella Lewitzky court left the NEA with its hands tied, or can the
government funding of obscenity be stopped? The present method, as it
stands after Bella Lewitzky, is an ineffective device to achieve the goal of
preventing obscene artistic works. Prior to the NEA's selection of grant
recipients, applicants submit a brief description of the artistic work they seek
to produce with the funding. 152 The NEA bases its decision whether to fund
the applicant in part on the artist's description. 53 This leaves the door open
for applicants to couch their true intended use of the money in neutral or
favorable language to appear non-controversial.
Senator Helms cited the description of the Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit
that was provided to the NEA as a basis for deciding to fund the project:
'To support a mid-career summary of the work of photographer Robert
Mapplethorpe. Although all aspects of the artist's work-the still lifes
[sic], nudes, and portraits-will be included, the exhibition will focus on
Mapplethorpe's unique pieces where photographic images interact with
richly textured fabrics within carefully design frames.' Mr. President [of
the Senate], what a useless and misleading description. No legitimate panel
of experts would know from this description that the 154
collection included

explicit homo-erotic photography and child obscenity.

The NEA could implement an alternative remedy, also preventive in
nature, by which the agency could more closely screen grant recipients. This
technique could demand a more in-depth, detailed description of the subject
matters, themes, messages, and purposes of the exhibit, thus allowing for a
closer scrutiny of the proposed artistic work before dispensing government
funds. Prior exhibits of the artist could also be reviewed as a determinative
criteria. Such a heightened review, easily blended into the current grant
process, could lead to the demise of government funded obscenity.
VI. CONCLUSION

Since the court in Bella Lewitzky DanceFoundationv. Frohnmayerfound
section 304 to be unconstitutional on January 9, 1991, the NEA has modified
its grant process. No longer will the NEA make determinations of obscenity.

151. Id. at 782.
152. Id. at 776.
153. Id.

154. 135 CONG. REc. S8807 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
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Instead, decisions of whether NEA-funded artistic works are obscene will be
left to the court system and its accompanying provision for juries. The NEA's
new position of restraint became effective February 8, 1991.
The NEA added the following language to its Grant Management
Manual: "Accordingly, the Endowment will enforce this [obscenity]
prohibition after a grantee has been convicted of violating a criminal obscenity
or child pornography statute and all appeal rights have been exhausted."155
PAUL N. RECHENBERG

155. This information was provided by the National Endowment for the Arts.
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